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Abstract: Nielsen and Klüver introduce the concept of 
cross-European technology assessment developed in the 
PACITA project, the layers of which are unfolded in the 
remaining chapters of this book. As a supplement to existing 
European institutions, cross-European technology assessment 
is a vision of a networked support system for national 
parliaments supplying process-support for knowledge-based 
and participatory policy making. As well as discussing 
the possible role of such a support system within existing 
European frameworks of policy formation, Nielsen and Klüver 
propose the necessity of capacity building modelled on the 
concept of cross-European technology assessment as a means 
to counterbalance trends towards European centralization in 
the face of grand societal challenges.
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European societies are pushed and pulled by tremendous forces in many 
directions at once. Science and technology has provided Europe and the 
world with incredible advances in production, health care, communica-
tion and almost any other aspect of human life. But our resource-hungry 
systems of production and consumption strain the supporting capacities 
of natural ecosystems, and we are moving from an era of abundance to 
one of scarcity. In a world of globally interconnected economies, systemic 
risks seem to increase exponentially and to far surpass the traditional 
managing capacities of nation states. Too often, however, the backbone 
reaction of decision makers is to invoke protocols of crisis management: 
gathering control in governmental centres and placing authority in the 
hands of narrow elites. In the case of the science-society relationship, 
large-scale research and innovation efforts accompanied by centralized 
social engineering regains prominence as decision makers attempt to 
take effective action. But while better knowledge and smarter solutions 
must undoubtedly be part of Europe’s way forward, centralization in 
itself presents a danger to the social fabric of societies. Whenever soci-
etal decision making is disconnected from the perspectives of those that 
feel its consequences in their daily lives, alienation and dissatisfaction 
enters the relationship between governments and citizens. Attempts to 
address the grand societal challenges of our time must therefore first 
face the necessity of building capacities for effective democratic govern-
ance. Each step towards stronger centralized capacities for action must 
be accompanied by equal steps to build capacities for problematizing 
evidence, debating values and adapting solutions to fit local needs and 
cultural contexts.
The core message of this book is that technology assessment holds at 
least some of the needed answers for how we can build such decentralized 
capacities for knowledge-based democratic decision making. Technology 
assessment (TA) is a discipline of public administration that seeks to build 
bridges between research and innovation, society at large and political 
decision makers. To operationalize this institutional mission, a wide 
range of methods have been developed that enable TA organizations to 
dynamically address different gaps of knowledge and communication in 
different societal situations. As such, TA may be viewed as an institutional 
answer to the problem of governing research and innovation responsibly, 
where the problem of governance is seen first and foremost as a problem 
of decoupling between the different kinds of knowledge and different sets 
of values held by different societal actors.
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The emergence of a diverse policy support function
TA began as an interdisciplinary academic endeavour in the 1960s, at 
which time the long-term risks from indiscriminate use of modern 
chemical and nuclear technologies was becoming increasingly clear. Pitted 
against an establishment unwilling to admit to its own errors of judge-
ment, TA first took the form of ‘reactive’ movement within academia, 
aiming to provide alternative evidence to support advocacy of mainly 
environmental protection and work-place conditions. This ‘watchdog’ 
role was expanded institutionally in the US at the national level when 
Congress established its Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) in 1972. 
Here TA – or parliamentary TA (PTA) as it came to be known – would 
act as analytical support to congressional oversight of the societal oppor-
tunities and consequences of the technological development.
TA was one of several strands of new, interdisciplinary forms of 
analysis seeking to provide guidance for decision makers in advanced 
industrial societies. Environmental impact assessment, risk assessment, 
foresight studies, technology ethics and the cross-disciplinary field of 
science-and-technology-studies (STS) all have their historical roots 
and institutional raison d’être in the apparent complexity of governing 
modern technology and the loss of popular trust suffered by experts and 
industrial stakeholders. There are many overlaps between these tradi-
tions in terms both of pragmatics of method and outlooks regarding the 
science-society relationship. The lines between TA and non-TA are thus 
not sharply drawn, and the different traditions mentioned continue to 
enrich each other.
In Europe, the first proposals for establishing capacities similar 
to that of the OTA were made immediately after the first round of 
European expansion in 1973. The idea of a common European Office 
of Technology Assessment, however, proved difficult for the member 
states to swallow, and a centralized unit dedicated to technology 
assessment and foresight would not see the light of day until the estab-
lishment of the Institute of Prospective Technology Studies (IPTS) 
as a subunit of the Joint Research Centre in 1992. Meanwhile, the TA 
concept had more immediate rapport with the individual national 
parliaments in Western Europe and the European Parliament itself. 
Beginning in the early 1980s and inspired by processes of knowledge 
sharing within the Commission-driven FAST program, TA institutions 
were established in connection with parliaments in Denmark, France, 
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Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. An office for 
Science and Technology Options Assessment (STOA) was set up in 
connection with the European Parliament in 1987. At later stages, PTA 
organizations were also established in Belgium, Finland, Greece, Italy, 
Norway, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland while TA organizations, but 
without the ‘P’, established in Austria, the Czech Republic and within 
the Council of Europe have also been part of the landscape of TA in 
Europe (see also Chapter 1 and Chapter 2). Over the years, these TA 
institutions developed more ‘proactive’ roles for TA in supporting 
policy development. TA became closely linked with foresight stud-
ies and now shares the attempts to identify desirable pathways for 
development through forward-looking exercises. Some TA institu-
tions took part in developing ‘constructive’ TA approaches to embed 
reflection on ethical, legal and social aspects (ELSA) in the develop-
ment process itself. Other institutions developed methods for citizen 
participation and stakeholder inclusion in policy development for 
technological innovation and planning, precipitating the ‘deliberative 
turn’ in research and innovation policy. Today, TA thus walks on two 
legs: policy analysis and public engagement.
Since at least the turn of the millennium, the stakes of science and 
technology policy have been raised significantly. The perspectives of 
impending climate change and peak oil, which have been accompanied 
by increasing global competition in innovation, have driven science and 
technology policy towards more complex forms of reflexive govern-
ance. In this situation, the European TA field has increasingly sought 
to consolidate its methods and to provide ‘strategic intelligence’ for 
European policy makers acting at both national and European levels. 
The European Parliamentary Technology Assessment (EPTA) network 
was established in 1990 to enable cooperation among dedicated parlia-
mentary TA units and units with similar goals. The IPTS has increas-
ingly sought to orchestrate deliberation at European level between 
different TA and foresight organizations. And various parliamentary and 
non-parliamentary TA organizations have been increasingly involved in 
the European Commission’s framework program for research, especially 




Mobilizing TA for grand challenges – the PACITA 
Project
The PACITA (Parliaments and Civil Society in Technology 
Assessment) project was set up under the 7th European Framework 
Program for research and development. It ran from 2011 to 2015 and 
was coordinated by the Danish Board of Technology. Working under 
the assumption that TA will need to adapt to the change towards the 
internationalization of science, technology and policy, the project’s 
overarching goal was to mobilize and expand the European TA 
community through processes of mutual experimentation and learn-
ing. Through such expansion, the working hypothesis of the project 
was that the TA field can grow into a Europe-wide support system for 
broadening the knowledge base of policy making in Europe. Helping 
to spread nationally based arrangements for providing TA services 
across Europe would serve the triple purpose of supporting national 
parliaments and governments, supporting and connecting national 
democracies across Europe in transnational dialogue and collabora-
tion and helping to strengthen the bottom-up dimension of European 
democratic governance. We call this distributed support system 
‘cross-European TA’.
The PACITA strategy for an expanding TA field was bound up 
with a strengthening of national democratic institutions. In the 
four-year course of the project, it gathered a group of fifteen partner 
organizations from different European countries in collaborative 
processes, which were at once linked to European agendas and based 
on national debates. Among these partners, some are established TA 
organizations connected to parliaments or otherwise formally organ-
ized to support national policy (the partners from Austria, Belgium 
(Flanders), Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain 
and Switzerland), while others are organizations with closely related 
missions interested in developing locally appropriate institutional 
models for TA (the partners from Belgium (Wallonia), Bulgaria, 
the Czech Republic, Hungary, Ireland and Portugal). Among the 
members of this group, enough diversity with regard to national 
settings was represented that the outcome of the project would be 
applicable across EU28 and the group of associated or candidate 
countries.
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Main findings of the project
The project pursued four operational aims, the outcomes of which are 
documented in this book. The first aim was to map and conceptually 
categorize existing PTA institutions and practices. The second aim 
was to help guide countries, which as yet had no such dedicated TA 
functions, in establishing TA institutions appropriate for their specific 
culture and settings. The third goal was to showcase and give hands-on 
experiences with the praxis, methodologies, outcomes and social value 
of collaboration among TA institutions across Europe. Finally, the 
fourth goal was to begin the process of building up mutual capacities 
for training and communicating TA practice and results in order to 
build a cross-European TA capacity of infrastructures and human 
resources.
To what extend are the goals of such a project realistic? It is of key 
importance to assess the contributions as well as the limitations of 
what has been attempted. A key issue in this regard is the question of 
methods and how well they travel from their original national contexts 
to other cultures and to cross-national collaborations. For example, 
PACITA carried out a process of stakeholder deliberations on the future 
of ageing in which national responses were formulated to strategies 
developed at European level (see Chapter 7). Here, it was clear that the 
national processes in and of themselves were both politically useful and 
perceived as legitimate by the participants. And from a trans-European 
point of view, the simultaneous but nationally particular formation of 
ideas for policy presents a potentially highly valuable addition to the 
general European policy-formation process. But we must acknowledge 
at the same time that without a clear institutional mandate within the 
overall process of European policy formation, the recommendations 
produced by such nationally based bottom-up processes risk drowning 
in the whirlwind of European debates. Similarly, institutional issues 
produced profound challenges to an experiment in which the PACITA 
partners orchestrated a cross-national Future Panel. The Future Panel is 
a process in which parliamentarians from across the political spectrum 
take part in a common process of learning and forming opinions about 
complex issues that arise from science and technology. In this case, a 
cross-national panel would gather to learn about and debate the possi-
ble contributions of advanced genomics research to public health care 
in the future (see Chapter 6). Here again, while those parliamentarians 
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who did take part were positively surprised and enthused by the spirit 
of deliberative inquiry that is embodied in the Future Panel, it was 
the lack of a common mandate from the involved parliaments which 
proved to be a stumbling block in the recruitment of parliamentarians 
for participation.
The benefits, however, should not be underplayed. A third PACITA 
experiment focused on public engagement and gathered citizens in 
different European member states in citizen summits to deliberate on 
the complex trade-offs involved in policy for sustainable consumption 
(see Chapter 8). This experiment provided strong indications that, when 
applied to the cross-European level, a deliberative take on public engage-
ment seems to be a viable strategy for squaring the circle of democratic 
involvement in centralized European policy making. Simultaneous 
national processes in which citizens are briefed on the best available 
knowledge and afforded time to deliberate in socially diverse groups 
provides high-quality, nationally founded, but still ‘European’ inputs to 
the European policy process.
Looking at the method dimensions, the PACITA model of bottom-up 
development of cross-European TA that organized and operationalized 
by existing and emerging TA institutions and that was supported by the 
European Commission seems to be a viable pathway for sowing the seeds 
of cross-European TA. The outcomes of the project are surely tangible 
and promising. But at the same time, the PACITA project covered only 
fifteen countries and, as such, was an experiment, though a successful 
one. Ultimately, the idea of a Europe-wide implementation of TA must 
be taken up politically and given a mandate in order for cross-European 
applications of TA methods to really work.
The PACITA project may be said to have expanded European TA 
capacities in at least four different dimensions:
Geographically: We have aimed at expanding the capacity and formal 
institutionalization across Europe and have succeeded in doing 
that perhaps more importantly, we have also sown seeds for further 
expansion in the future.
Collaboratively: Developing cross-European TA for the benefit of Europe 
as well as for the member states has been a core aim of PACITA, and 
we have definitely proved that there is a large need for this and that 
there are big potentials in developing a truly European collaborative 
space for TA.
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Conceptually: The background, context and function of existing TA 
institutes have been scrutinized intensely with important new insights 
in the role and function of TA as a result.
Conceptually: The background, context and function of existing TA 
institutes have been scrutinized intensely with important new insights 
in the role and function of TA as a result.
Politically: At two parliamentary meetings with representatives from the 
EPTA and PACITA countries and beyond, it was clearly stated by the 
MPs that TA has a very important role to play for EU, Europe in a 
wider sense, and for the EU member states. A clear call has been made 
for a strong Commission engagement in widening the TA landscape 
in Europe and in providing options for new countries to take up TA.
Why cross-European TA?
What this book substantiates is the claim that going forward, the issue 
is not whether cross-European TA is possible. The book shows that 
the needed professional approaches exist, the national capacities can 
be built – often on the shoulders of existing ones – and collaboration 
between institutions distributed across Europe can be brought to work. 
Rather, the question is whether and why European policy makers and 
parliamentarians at national and transnational levels ought to support a 
vision of the development of cross-European TA capacities. The remain-
der of this introduction is dedicated to providing a frame in which to 
answer this question.
To begin with, we should try to get at the overall question whether 
there is in fact a need to strengthen national level capacities for policy 
analysis and public deliberation. The standard counterargument is that 
with global challenges we need global solutions and a strengthening of 
transnational decision-making capacities. For many, a ‘return’ to the 
nation state is unrealistic and represents in any case a step backwards. 
We are, however, not arguing for a ‘return’ to the nation state and a purely 
intergovernmental mode of European collaboration. On the contrary, our 
argument is that national democracies need strengthening in order to 
take their proper place in European – or global – multilevel governance.
The cornerstone of European collaboration remains the subsidiarity 
principle. And while the future will tell whether European collabora-
tion will grow into federation, the sign of the times do not point in 
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that direction. A realistic approach to drawing on Europe’s collective 
strengths to efficiently address grand challenges must therefore take seri-
ously the continuing role of national member states as a crucial level of 
policy adaption to local contexts. By the same token, with the process of 
European integration halted somewhere between inter-governmentalism 
and federated statehood, European institutions remain systematically 
under-democratized. Consequently, the national parliaments will remain 
privileged as fora for maintaining true European democracy.
What remains true logically, however, is challenged in real life. At the 
national level, the capacities of parliaments to act as counterweight to 
national executives have been systematically weakened by European 
integration. Parliaments have less formal access to providing input to 
common European policy processes than do governments. Parliaments 
therefore end up on the receiving end of the policy process, and the diver-
sity of input that they represent is narrowed significantly. A similar effect 
of narrowing democratic diversity can be traced in the representative 
function of political parties. Here, the process of European integration 
has led the major centre parties in each member state to crowd around 
common middle positions compatible enough with the European main-
stream to be strategically viable.
This process of consensus-building that centres on ‘necessary’ rather 
than ‘wished’ policies is amplified by the national economic strategic idea 
of the ‘competition state’ – the conception that international competition 
forces nations to act as if they were large companies. This conception has 
had highly detrimental effects on the range of futures and policies being 
imagined, and politically, it has inhibited the agility of centre parties, 
thus weakening parliamentary collaboration across parties.
The need for strengthening national parliaments is not about strength-
ening individual nations against the European community, nor is it a call 
for dis-integration. Rather, it is a call for strengthening precisely the part 
of the European system, which must be strong if Europe is to become 
legitimate
The role of cross-European TA in European 
governance
The inadequacies of the national and regional levels of governance are 
well understood and lie at the heart of the motivation for the development 
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of the European Union in the first place. The capacities needed to 
continuously modernize society’s infrastructure through research and 
development have long surpassed the size of the purses of individual 
nations. Consequently, cooperation on the advancement of research was 
one of the very first issue areas where the logic of cooperation became 
clear to European member states. Likewise, the scale of the mechanisms 
needed to render innovation economically viable has outgrown national 
markets. This is why the common European market has been a central 
guiding star for Europe for more than a generation and the European 
Research Area has such a prominent position.
With the pooling of innovative resources and merging of markets, 
much of the regulatory ability of member states has also shifted to the 
European level. One the one hand, this has allowed Europe to build a 
global region protected by the most progressive environmental and 
social protections in the world. But on the other hand, along with global 
deregulation to enhance trade flow, this shift has contributed to a lock-in 
situation for member states where increased cooperation is often not 
an option but the only viable path. Single member states are at a great 
disadvantage in relation to globalized industries and financial actors able 
to move production and capital from one country to the next. Countries 
wishing to move environmental and social policy forward – tools that 
will likely prove crucial in addressing grand challenges – are often 
bound to negotiate such changes within the traditional framework of 
European decision making known as the ‘community method’. This is 
the framework in which national executives gathered as the Council of 
Ministers set out policy goals, which are then fleshed out in regulatory 
proposals by the European Commission to be approved by the European 
Parliament and ultimately the Council itself.
Often cited democratic dilemmas and deficiencies of the community 
method have led to the formulation of alternative governance strategies. 
The European Commission, for instance, has increasingly made use of 
soft governance approaches to coordinate societal actors around common 
goals. We see this in the response of the Commission to the Lund 
Declaration in the Europe 2020 strategy. Here public-private partnerships 
and networking initiatives meant to stimulate self-governance within 
industry are combined with a focus on societally strategic research and 
innovation. A cross-cutting framework to structure the self-governance 
of actors that participate in these strategic exercises is emerging under the 
title ‘responsible research and innovation’ (RRI). Within this framework, 
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participation in research and innovation activities funded or otherwise 
stimulated by the Commission will be dependent on the willingness to 
undertake self-governance measures to align R&I output with the needs 
of society. Such measures, whichever practical form they may take, 
shall enact the principles of inclusiveness, anticipation, reflexivity and 
responsiveness. The ideal embedded in these principles is those of a self-
regulatory system of multiple societal actors able to converge on common 
goals through ongoing dialogue and mutual learning. To a very large 
extent, this ideal has always been shared by the technology assessment 
community. Whether TA has been reactive, proactive, ‘constructive’ or 
‘participatory’, TA has always sought to embed upstream societal reflec-
tions in the real-world processes of science, technology and innovation 
policy, precisely to achieve outcomes that would be already well rounded 
and aligned with the needs and values of multiple societal actors. The 
only major point at which the TA project still stands out from the RRI 
framework – and the point around which the unique value TA may add to 
RRI crystalizes – is the practical and institutional commitment to retain 
and strengthen the embedding of such soft governance approaches in the 
institutions of representative democracy.
Cross-European TA – still in the sense of national policy-oriented 
TA bodies in all states collaborating at European level – may thus play 
a number of important roles in consolidating the ideas in modern 
European governance:
The need to strengthen national parliaments in the EU is broadly  
acknowledged, but the structures to facilitate that change are 
lacking. Here, TA can play an important role by serving parliaments 
with knowledge, analysis and debate on EU developments in 
science, technology and innovation.
The importance of the subsidiarity principle is greater than ever,  
but adhering to it may produce locked decision-making situations 
under the community method. Circumventing such dead ends 
demands the creation of spaces for open explorative dialogue 
across the EU, involving citizens, stakeholders and parliaments. TA 
has longstanding traditions which make it an obvious player for 
creating such cross-European analytical dialogue.
Governments are forced to become more and more European,  
while parliaments become increasingly national – some may even 
say provincial. TA can build bridges for parliaments across Europe, 
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thereby enhancing the connection between parliamentary debates 
and European developments.
The EU   needs to get in contact with citizens and to support 
the emergence of a true ‘European public’, but it faces a lack 
of European identity. With national TA institutions in place, a 
platform emerges with the legitimacy to engage and consult citizens 
on the national level and connect the outcomes at the EU level – 
which makes TA a potentially perfect partner for both the national 
and the EU level governance.
Cross-European TA collaboration can add to the smart  
specialization aims by, on the one hand, facilitating the needed 
discourse at the national level and, on the other hand, ensuring 
that it is connected across Europe – allowing for a certain level of 
coordination of the specialization.
TA at the national level is an important factor for having a rich  
analysis and conversation about the societal opportunities and 
challenges stemming from science, technology and innovation. 
Having TA institutionalized in all European states will provide 
an opportunity for expanding that analysis and conversation to 
the European level and creating much needed links between the 
multiple levels of the European governance system.
The PACITA consortium has on the basis of these thoughts and the 
lessons of the PACITA project provided the TA Manifesto, which has 
gained support from more than 300 signatories.1
Note
See http://www.pacitaproject.eu/ta-manifesto/.1 
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